But those 90 days have come and gone. And in that time, Trump has finalized just two interim deals, one with Vietnam and one with the U.K., and most of their details are yet to be finalized let alone negotiated. (A third “deal” with China was really only a ceasefire in the escalating war of tariffs, export controls and sanctions, effectively returning the situation to where it was in early April).
All the while, many countries are still scrambling to get a deal before the end of July, including the EU, Canada, Japan, Mexico, and all the other countries that have received a presidential letter indicating what their tariff levels will be as of the August deadline.
But even if some deals are struck by then, they will likely be few in number and alarmingly short on details. The truth is, despite his reputation as a dealmaker, Trump is, above all, a tariff man. Even with the postponement of prior deadlines, he has effectively raised tariffs on imports into the U.S. to levels unseen in nearly a century.
Trump views tariffs in three ways: He believes they are an efficient and cheap way to raise revenue, which is why his 10 percent “reciprocal tariff” minimum on all trading partners is likely to stay.
He also believes other countries have been stealing U.S. jobs and manufacturing capabilities, and he wants them back. His sectoral tariffs on automobiles, steel, aluminum, copper and soon likely on pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, lumber and other products are meant to strengthen U.S. capacity at home. Therefore, these, too, are likely to remain.
Finally, he believes tariffs can compensate for, or even eliminate, bilateral trade deficits, and the deals he seeks are focused on addressing this long-standing concern. It doesn’t matter that bilateral deficits in goods tell us nothing about economic strength — as any economist will tell you. Trump sees deficits as a loss and surpluses as a gain. And he sees himself as a winner.