Expert Explains: Unpacking Israel-Hamas deal | Explained News

The IDF will withdraw from central Gaza and the Netzarim Corridor — a 2-4-km-wide security clearing that it has created, cutting Gaza in half up to the Mediterranean — and eventually from the Philadelphi Corridor, the buffer zone along the Gaza-Egypt border.

Negotiations for a second phase will begin on the 16th day after the ceasefire comes into effect, and is expected to produce almost a full Israeli withdrawal from the Strip, and the release of all remaining hostages by Hamas in return for a yet-to-be-decided number of Palestinian detainees.

In the third phase, border crossings will be reopened fully, and reconstruction will begin in Gaza.

Outgoing United States President Joe Biden, President-elect Donald Trump, and Qatar’s government announced the ceasefire and hostage deal.

Until Thursday evening, however, Israel’s cabinet was yet to convene to discuss the proposal before a formal vote of ratification.

How did negotiations progress up to this point; why has a deal been struck now?

An agreement very similar to the one that has been agreed upon now has been on the table at least since May 2024. That so-called “Biden Plan” too, was three-phased, began with a 42-day cessation of hostilities, and committed Hamas to releasing 33 Israeli hostages in the first stage.

The deal was reportedly accepted by Hamas on May 7, but Israel rejected it — saying Hamas had insisted on unacceptable last-minute amendments, even as the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) struck Rafah.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders insisted that Hamas needed to be completely destroyed in Gaza before a ceasefire could be considered, but committed to continuing negotiations with US, Egyptian, and Qatari mediation.

At the time, much before Israel’s battlefield successes against Hezbollah and the killing of Hamas leaders Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar, Netanyahu had committed himself more to destroying Hamas than to securing the release of the hostages.

There was a domestic political context: at the time, Itamad Ben-Gvir’s far right Otzma Yehudit party, with its six Knesset seats, held a veto over government decisions. This changed in September, after current Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s New Hope party joined the coalition.

On January 14, as the current ceasefire negotiations culminated, Ben-Gvir admitted the loss of control over government decision-making, and announced that he had blocked such a proposal “time after time” in the past.

With Israel having decapitated both Hezbollah and Hamas, his coalition strengthened by Sa’ar, and with Trump’s Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff mounting pressure during the negotiations, there were more reasons for Netanyahu to accept a deal.

Most importantly, in exchange for the short-term concession of a ceasefire in Gaza, Netanyahu will be looking to garner longer-term benefits from Trump’s second term — both locally against a possible sovereign Palestinian state, and regionally against Iran.

What stands out in the terms of the ceasefire agreement?

A Knesset vote is not necessary for the ceasefire to reflect Israeli acceptance; a cabinet resolution is sufficient. While the far right is still prominent in the cabinet, Ben-Gvir has effectively admitted its inability to block a ceasefire again.

Two important aspects with potentially far-reaching implications stand out in the terms of the deal.

WITHDRAWAL FROM PHILADELHI CORRIDOR: For almost all of 2024, Netanyahu was opposed to withdrawing from the Philadelphi Corridor — an insistence that was central to his rift with former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, as well as an obstacle in the negotiations as Hamas claimed that Israel had inserted the need for permanent presence in the Netzarim and Philadelphi Corridors at a very late stage.

Egypt too has been opposed to a permanent Israeli presence. Netanyahu has pointed to the continued ability of Hamas to smuggle arms and equipment across the corridor despite Egyptian policing and Israeli airstrikes, and the fact that if Israel vacates it, the IDF is unlikely to be allowed to return by the international community.

In terms of the deal now, Israel is supposed to vacate the corridor by the 42nd day of the first phase. However, Israeli media outlets have quoted officials denying that such a commitment is unqualified — and asserting that the final decision would depend on negotiations that begin on the 16th day.

RELEASE OF PRISONERS: Israel has a history of agreeing to release disproportionately large numbers of Palestinian prisoners in return for Israeli hostages — it released 4,700 Arabs in return for six Israelis held by the Palestine Liberation Organisation in 1983, and 1,150 Palestinians in return for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine releasing three Israelis as part of the Jibril Agreement in 1985.

Then, under Netanyahu in 2011, Israel released 1,027 Palestinian prisoners — 280 of whom were serving life sentences — in exchange for a single IDF soldier, Gilad Shalit, held by Hamas. This exchange eventually prompted the Knesset to pass a law in 2014 to prevent the release of prisoners serving life sentences in future exchanges.

The terms of the present ceasefire agreement include Israel releasing at least 250 prisoners serving life sentences. This potential concession is perhaps the most prominent aspect of the deal. It remains to be seen how this part of the deal sits with the 2014 law, however.

After 14 months of war, what does this agreement mean for Israel and Hamas?

FOR HAMAS, the ceasefire is a victory. With its traditional organisation and leadership in dire straits after the relentless and indiscriminate Israeli air and ground action, the group needs time and resources to recoup.

But Hamas has also shown that it continues to be effective in switching tactics — and it is still causing Israeli fatalities.

The IDF lost 16 soldiers to Hamas guerilla attacks in Northern Gaza’s Beit Hanoun alone across the last week, following which the Israeli media observed that the group’s local command structure remains intact in the town. At least three IDF brigades from the 162nd Division remain tied down in Beit Hanoun.

On January 14, the outgoing US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that Hamas had managed to recruit as many militants as it had lost to Israeli military action. For phases two and three, Hamas insists on a continued presence in any future government in Gaza.

In reports on the ceasefire deal, there is no mention of the Palestinian Authority returning to Gaza. It would appear that Hamas is attempting to secure a spot in Gaza’s government like Hezbollah did in Lebanon in the years after the Taif Agreement that ended the Lebanese Civil War in 1989.

FOR ISRAEL, the ceasefire has come after it has weakened the Iranian axis significantly, and killed Hamas leaders whom it has long targeted. However, its declared objective of ejecting Hamas from Gaza through military force remains unfulfilled. For Netanyahu and his far right allies, this is a setback.

However, the release of all hostages will undeniably be a victory for Netanyahu, especially given the increasingly loud protests from families and relatives of Israelis who are still in Gaza, alive or dead.

Domestically, Netanyahu could come under fresh pressure. On one hand, agreeing to a lopsided hostage-prisoner swap could dent his far right support and feed allegations of betrayal. And on the other, politicians like Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid have used Ben-Gvir’s statements to assert that a deal for hostage release was itself held hostage for political considerations.

What Trump can offer after taking office in return for Netanyahu adhering to a ceasefire deal will be crucial.

Bashir Ali Abbas is a Senior Research Associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi