C Raja Mohan writes | Europe without America: Can the Continent cope with Russia?

Second, since Trump’s return, Europe’s focus has been on boosting its conventional military strength to reduce its prolonged reliance on American weapons and personnel. Last week, the European Union finalised a plan called “Readiness 2030”, aimed at bolstering Europe’s military capabilities. It proposes to mobilise up to 800 billion euros ($ 872 billion) over four years, with 150 billion euros to be borrowed from capital markets and the remaining 650 billion expected from increased national defence spending. Germany, the richest economy in Europe, wants to lead by example and has won domestic political support for a massive expansion of defence expenditure. But divisions remain deep in Europe on how to go about crafting a new defence strategy. Initially called “Rearm Europe”, the plan had to be renamed due to reservations expressed by Italy and Spain, which argued the title was too provocative.

Finally, Europe has begun to debate the role of nuclear weapons in its new security strategy. Russia’s war in Ukraine has put an end to the argument that nuclear weapons do not matter for global security in the 21st century. It is inconceivable that Russia would have invaded if Kyiv had been armed with nuclear weapons. Even more important was former US president Joe Biden’s decision, taken immediately after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, to avoid at all costs an escalation of the conflict to the nuclear level. If anyone had forgotten about Russia’s nuclear sword hanging over Europe, Putin helped remind them. The vanishing credibility of the US’s nuclear umbrella is forcing Europe to think the unthinkable. Prospective German chancellor Friedrich Merz has proposed engaging France and Britain on extending nuclear deterrence over Germany, while Polish PM Donald Tusk expressed interest in Warsaw potentially developing its own nuclear capabilities.

France, as Europe’s leading nuclear power, has been at the forefront of the new nuclear debate. President Emmanuel Macron has initiated consultations on how France’s nuclear deterrent could play a role in European security, inviting allies to participate in strategic dialogues and observe French nuclear exercises. This reflects France’s long-standing position that its vital interests “have a European dimension”, implying that its nuclear deterrent could contribute to broader European security.

The road to a European nuclear deterrent, however, is littered with challenges. The combined nuclear arsenal of France and Britain, estimated at around 500 warheads, is significantly smaller than Russia’s arsenal of close to 6,000 warheads. Developing new nuclear capabilities would be extremely costly and technologically challenging, not to mention the legal implications stemming from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, France maintains full control over its nuclear forces and has shown no intention of sharing decision-making authority, complicating any European nuclear sharing arrangement. These obstacles are not insurmountable. The question is about resolving tensions between the mounting European sense of the Russian threat and the difficulty of an internal consensus on a coherent military nuclear strategy.

Medvedev’s conception of Europe is by no means the only one in Russia. Moscow has oscillated between teasing Europeans away from America by talking of a “common European home” on the one hand and seeking a joint Russo-American condominium over Europe on the other. The former is represented by the idea of “Helsinki”, a reference to the 1970s Helsinki Accords that framed a common security framework for Europe. “Yalta” represents the latter, where Joseph Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill carved up Europe into spheres of influence at the end of World War II.

Here is the problem, though. Neither Yalta nor Helsinki appears feasible now. Even if Trump wants to recognise a Russian sphere of influence, most Europeans, especially those on Moscow’s western frontiers, will not accept it. The idea of a new Helsinki appears equally impossible, given the post-Ukraine resentments between Europe and Russia. The only realistic possibility might be that Europe, in its own tortuous style, develops the necessary collective capabilities to build an armed peace. The idea that 350 million people in Europe with a GDP of $16 trillion can never defend themselves against Russia with a population of 140 million and a GDP of $2.2 trillion is an anomaly.

Russia will bet that Europe, without American backing, will revert to its historical pattern of internal squabbling. The backers of the integration project hope that the old continent will finally end its geopolitical holiday. Some economists suggest that militarisation could be the answer to Europe’s prolonged economic stagnation. Optimists will argue that even the weakest entities fight back when pushed to the wall. Pessimists will keep their fingers crossed. Realists will keep Europe at the top of their geopolitical watchlist.

The writer is contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express