Mar 20, 2025 12:55 IST
First published on: Mar 20, 2025 at 12:55 IST
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At best, Aurangzeb was a man of contradictions — in his lifetime three centuries ago, and in the afterlife, which he has recently gained due to the failings of central and state governments. Be it the controversy over his tomb in Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar district near Nagpur or the suspension of a Maharashtra MLA from the state assembly for the rest of the budget session, Aurangzeb keeps resurfacing in our political discourse.
As a prince, he was the ablest amongst his brothers — an experienced general, a man of few words and quick on action, cold, calculating and feared. As a king, he presided over one of the greatest empires of the time, but a sovereignty that was severely compromised from the moment of takeover itself. The mighty sacrality of Mughal kingship assiduously built from Akbar onwards had been broken by the very means he took up control, so much so that at each step his actions were suspect and challenged. His reign witnessed not only a crisis of credibility but also an agrarian crisis, a jagir crisis, and a crumbling of the cohesion of a so-far loyal nobility. Most military measures which he initiated failed, and within decades of coming to the throne, the empire witnessed such revolts which had never occurred before.
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All this forced him, as usually happens in most such cases, to resort to the use of religion to help him solve the problems. He came to the throne in 1658 after the battle of Samugarh and was officially crowned in 1660. But it was only after the failures that in 1679, he resorted to discriminatory policies like imposition of jizya, breaking of temples and other such activities. In 1680, his own son rebelled and fled to the court of Sambhaji, who gave him shelter. Aurangzeb’s involvement in the Deccan from 1681 down to his death in 1707 had been labelled as “Spanish ulcer” by historian Jadunath Sarkar.
Aurangzeb and the Marathas
Like his entire reign, his dealings with the Marathas, too, are full of ironies. Shivaji’s sacking of Surat in 1664, and his attack on the Mughal governor of Deccan, Shaista Khan, a relative of the emperor the previous year, forced Aurangzeb to pay serious attention to the rising Maratha conundrum. Shaista Khan survived but lost the Mughal prestige to the adversary. Surat had been the economic nerve centre of the empire, as Mumbai is today to India. The worst sufferers of the burning of Surat had been the bania merchants of the area, some of whom were the financiers to the Mughal state.
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It is remarkable to see that at this stage it was not a Central Asian (Turani) or Iranian commander who volunteered to help Aurangzeb to deal with the problem. It was Mirza Raja Jai Singh, the watan jagirdar of Amber, and a grandee holding the highest rank of 8000/8000 which could ever be granted to a noble who offered to deal with Shivaji. In 1665, at Purandar, it was Jai Singh who forced Shivaji to sign a treaty through which, on the one hand, most Maratha forts held by Shivaji were given to the Mughals, and, on the other, Shivaji and his son Sambhaji were offered mansabs (ranks) of 5000/5000. They were inducted as grandees to the court, just like the Rajputs of the north. Shivaji attended the court at Agra, but did not agree to be given a position lower to that of Shaista Khan whom once he had almost killed. He was lodged in the mansion of Ram Singh, son of Jai Singh, from where he soon escaped and returned to the Deccan and crowned himself the king.
Chhatrapati Shivaji died the same year as the rebellion of Prince Aurangzeb, who fled and reached the Maratha court where Sambhaji had taken over as the king.
Aurangzeb and Sambhaji
The engagements between the Mughals and the Marathas that followed were not so much between a Muslim and a Hindu, but a fight over domination between a central force and a regional one. If Mughal armies were led by Rajputs and Hindus, the forces of the Marathas had powerful Muslim commanders. The other two important Deccani states during the time were Bijapur and Golconda, and both had Muslim kings and ruling classes. Both decided to side with the Marathas. So, Aurangzeb had to defeat both Bijapur and Golconda before he could proceed against Sambhaji. Had it been a matter of two religions, Bijapur and Golconda should have aligned with Aurangzeb. These Muslim states had good relations with the Mughals under Shah Jahan. Aurangzeb was perceived by all three as an invader to the Deccan.
All historical sources inform us that Sambhaji was ultimately defeated, not because of any other reason, but due to the betrayal by some of his own, and his overconfidence, perhaps a result of political miscalculations. The reasons were the same for Bijapur and Golconda, too. They were defeated not by any military superiority of Aurangzeb’s army, but due to betrayals and bribes. The shirkes and a group of Brahmins, who had been tax collectors for the Marathas, gave intelligence to the Mughals. Jadunath Sarkar writes that in October 1688 they rose in rebellion and attacked Sambhaji’s confidant, Kavi Kalash. Sambhaji rescued his protege and decided to pass his time in merry-making in the mansion of Kavi Kalash at Sangameshwar. The spies revealed the location to the Mughal commander Muqarrab Khan who stealthily marched to surround Sambhaji. Sambhaji was informed of the approaching army, but he remained sceptical. After his capture, he was offered a truce like Purandar: Surrender territories and forts and agree to join service as a mansabdar. Sambhaji’s refusal led to the same treatment as was meted out to rebels — execution.
The Deccan conundrum under Aurangzeb was a political clash between two rulers over territory and had nothing to do with faith. It is also interesting to see that in the new syllabus, every other Mughal emperor is invisibilised except the “communal” Aurangzeb. Unfortunately, Aurangzeb is today used as a tool to “other” a community. Aurangzeb made mistakes in using religion to iron over his economic and political problems. The same shouldn’t be done by the rulers of our times.
The writer is a Mughal historian and teaches at Aligarh Muslim University